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INVESTMENT ADVICE AND THE
FRAUD RULES
Robert N. Leavell*
I.

E

INTRODUCTION

day thousands of Americans are assaulted by mail, telephone, and personal contact with advice on how to invest their
money for capital gains, often with dazzling reminders of the opportunity for great profits.1 If the advice is good, they may indeed
one day have their treasure ship which will send their children to
college or provide a round-the-world trip after retirement. If the
advice is bad, they will of course learn by experience. But many
of them will have to apply their lesson to a second inheritance or
twenty years' savings. The quality of investment advice is therefore
a subject with serious human implications, and implications, too,
for the health of a national economy which depends on investment
by the masses.2 This article aims to tell something about who gives
the advice, how it is formulated, and what legal controls govern its
sincerity and competence.
This analysis draws heavily upon the lode of information exposed by the Special Study of Securities Markets, conducted by a
special staff under the general supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as material which has come to light in
considering the recommendations of that group. 3
VERY

II.

TYPICAL FIRM ACTIVITIES,

SOURCES OF CONTROL, AND RESEARCH TECHNIQUES

The deluge of oral and printed investment advice comes from
firms engaging in a wide range of activities. What these activities
are and who regulates them are of interest at this point, leaving for
later a more detailed examination of the legal controls. Also included by way of background are some comments about the research
• Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1948, Mississippi; LL.B. 1952,
Yale.-Ed. I am indebted to Richard Paul, Esq., of the New York Bar, and Professor
Alfred Conard, of tbe Michigan Law School, for their valuable suggestions during the
early stages of tbis article. Of course, the views expressed are those of the author alone.
I. For some interesting examples, see Securities &: Exchange Commission, Report of
Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 367-68 (1963). [Part I of the Commission's report
is hereinafter cited as Special Study.]
2. Id. at 9-11.
3. See special Study.
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techniques which are used by those in the securities business in
examining stocks to determine their investment merit.

A. Activities and Who Control Them
Most investment advice comes from either broker-dealer firms
or "publishing firms"; both perform a variety of services, although
the activities of the numerically larger broker-dealer group are likely
to be the most varied. 4 A broker-dealer firm is out to bring about
purchases and sales in order to earn commissions; it may also be seeking a profit on stocks it already owns, or, as it is usually put, in which
it has an "inventory." To attract business it distributes at least one
weekly "market letter" with advisory suggestions to a large number
of customers and potential customers. The firm hopes that the recipient will be prompted by what he reads to make or consider a purchase or sale. When the distributed materials have the desired effect,
the potential customer usually contacts a firm salesman (or "customer's man") with whom the transaction is at least briefly discussed.
This salesman is on the telephone during the day suggesting investment action to customers and potential customers, basing his comments on the market letters or on other information drawn from his
firm's research department as well as from his own "research." To
aid him, there is usually a wire service which he uses to send inquiries
about specific stocks to personnel at the home office and from which
he receives a steady flow of advisory data and suggestions.
The firm does not charge the customer separately for these services, but regards them as paid for by the commissions earned from
the buying and selling it handles for the customer. The firm may
also supply, at no charge, detailed studies of industries and individual securities to a select group of customers, usually referred to as
"institutional" investors, whose purchases and sales involve large
sums. As a further service, it may offer to review customers' portfolios, doing this free of charge. Fees, however, may be charged for
such advisory services as continuous portfolio management.
Variety is also to be found in the activities of "publishing firms"
which sell advice to their subscribers. 5 They seek subscriptions by
extensive newspaper advertising, direct mail solicitation, and by personal contact. To induce subscriptions they distribute special advisory materials and offer to review a new subscriber's portfolio
4. The summary which follows is drawn from id. at 330-33, 344-58.
5. Id. at 353, 359-69.
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without charge. Many also derive a large part of their income from
managing portfolios for a fee.
Because broker-dealer firms are avid subscribers to advisory publications, and because their salesmen are avid users of them, the
advice of publishing firms often influences the broker-dealer's recommendations.
Both kinds of firms, and those whom they employ, are regulated
in several ways. In the case of the broker-dealer firm, the extent of
the regulation will depend on whether it trades in both "listed" and
"unlisted" stocks, as well as on whether it charges for any of the
investment advice services it offers. If the firm buys and sells listed
stocks for its customers on a regular basis, it must have a membership on the stock exchange which has accepted the stock for listing.6
Exchange membership subjects the member firms, most of whom
actively supply information and advice to obtain brokerage business, 7 to the rules and disciplinary procedures of the exchanges. The
exchanges are commonly talked of as being self-regulatory; despite this epithet, they have not been entirely self-regulating since
the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requiring that
they be registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
which controls various aspects of their activities. 8
Dealing in unlisted securities involves additional relationships.
Most firms seeking to buy or sell on commission, or to sell from
their own inventories, unlisted securities traded in the over-thecounter market find it necessary to be members of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 9 even though they may
also be members of an exchange. The NASD came under extensive
federal control when, in 1938, the Securities Exchange Act was
amended to require that it register with the SEC.10 Organized on
a national basis, the NASD has regional committees to police the
conduct of its members under NASD rules.11 In addition, all broker6. Id. at 11-14 (as this material indicates, "allied" membership arrangements have increased greatly in recent years). There is a relatively small but increasing percentage
of over-the-counter trading in listed stocks. Id. at 14. See also 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULA·
TION II72 n.8 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
7. Special Study 244-50, 344-45.
8. 2 Loss 1165-83.
9. In trading with nonmember broker-dealers, National Association of Securities
Dealers members must charge the same price as they charge the general public,
whereas member broker-dealers may be given a "wholesale" price. Special Study 13.
IO. 2 Loss 1359-91; with respect to SEC control of over-the-counter brokers and
dealers, see id. at 1288-358.
11. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NATIONAL AssocIATION OF SECURI·
TIES DEALERS MANUAL C-25 to -33 (By-laws), D-23,-24 (Rules of Fair Practice, art. IV)
(1965). See also 2 Loss 1371-80.
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dealer firms conducting an interstate over-the-counter business must
also register with the SEC,12 which, as will be seen, exercises important controls over them.
The individual securities salesman is required to register with
the NASD, if he is employed by a member firm, as well as to register
with any exchange to which his firm belongs.13
For those firms which sell printed advisory literature, or, for a
fee, offer advice on a personal basis, but do not act as a broker or
dealer in the purchase and sale of stocks, there is at present no selfregulatory or cohesive national organization.14 However, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires that these firms be registered
with the SEC as "investment advisers." 15 Exchange and NASD members engaging in advisory activities for which they charge a fee must
also be registered with the SEC as "investment advisers." 16

B. Research Techniques
Investment recommendations pouring out from these sources
have, of course, been arrived at in various ways, many of which are
highlighted in the following summary of the Special Study findings.
They are the product of a process-called here the "advisory process"
-which ordinarily involves three steps. The first, or formulation,
step involves the study of the particular stock and the formulation
of conclusions with respect to its investment merits. There are essentially two broad approaches used in the evaluation of securities, the
"fundamental" and the "technical."17 Individual analysts by and
large adhere to one approach or the other; those who use the fundamental approach are known as security analysts, and those who use
, the technical approach are known as market analysts.
Security analysis is the basis for the great bulk of investment
advice. The security analyst studies-in varying degrees, depending
upon the purpose and thoroughness of his examination-such basic
matters as the company's financial statements, earnings, the ratio of
12. Securities Ex.change Act of 1934 § 1-34, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a to hh-1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ex.change Act]. See also Special Study 69;
2 Loss 1288-94.
13. Special Study 116-17, 120-22, 129; 2 Loss 1367-69, 1386-87.
14. Special Study 148. See also id. at 386, para. "5." The Special Study recommended
that this be considered.
15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203, 54 Stat. 850, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1964);
Special Study 148.
16. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203, 54 Stat. 850, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1964).
See also Special Study 146.
17. The brief textual comment concerning these two techniques is taken from id.
at 332. For a detailed treatment of the security analyst's task, see GRAHAM, DODD 8:
CoTILE, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (4th ed. 1962).
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the stock's price to the company's earnings and cash flow, dividends,
management, sales, markets, competition, products, and product
changes. Also of concern to him are the many economic and political
forces which affect the company, the price of the security, and market prices in general.
Technical or market analysis is concerned almost exclusively
with the interior action of the stock market itself: the patterns of
securities prices and the volume of trading. The market analyst may
study "point and figure" charts or data relating to such things as
odd-lot transactions and insiders' transactions. He examines trends
in the immediate past in the hope that they will give indications of
movements in the immediate future. He is more concerned with
timing than the security analyst, and, as a result, the investor who
acts on his recommendation tends to be more oriented toward trading than investing.
Despite its obvious importance, this formulation stage of the advisory process has received very little regulatory attention. Most
controls have centered on the second, or communication, stage
which entails communicating in detailed or abbreviated form18 the
results of the formulation stage to the person, usually the investor,
who will make an investment.decision. The final step involves the
process of reaching a decision as to what action, if any, the investor,
or one acting for him, will take.19

III. THE

SPECIAL STUDY FINDINGS CONCERNING

INVESTMENT ADVICE

The Special Study makes it possible as never before to tell the
story of what goes on in the investment advice world.20 The summary of its findings occupies some fifty pages of eight-point type. 21
It will only be possible to hit such of the high spots as provide a
back-drop for the discussion of controls. The reader should be
warned that the whole story is interesting reading, and also that it
is far more detailed and complex than is apparent from what follows.
The Special Study findings were based upon a comprehensive
examination of the advisory activities of all segments of the invest18. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
19. All three steps may be undertaken by the adviser, as in the case of an adviser's
doing his own research for accounts over which he has discretionary control.
20, The great earlier investigation, that of Pecora, did not give detailed consideration to investment advice problems. See PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939).
See also 2 Loss 1166.
21, Special Study at 880-87,
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ment advisory community. All the advisory communications, over
a significant period of time, of firms of all types and sizes were examined, in many instances by going to the firms and questioning all
of those who had a hand in formulating the advice or in getting it
to the customer.22 Considered in these inquiries were oral communications, printed advisory materials of all types including regular
market letters and subscription publications, special detailed reports
sent to large institutional investors, portfolio analyses, and advertising materials. The Special Study also selected for particular attention securities which, aided by extensive favorable advisory comment,
had undergone a phenomenal rise in price, only to become worthless shortly thereafter. In the case of these, the history of every recommendation from every source was investigated in detailed manner.
Perhaps the most striking impression gained from the Study
findings is the remarkable disparity both between the conduct of
different investment advisers and the ways in which those in the
field view their responsibilities. 23 Responsible investment advice requires that analysts have special skills to analyze the operations and
market prospects of the corporation in question, and it entails an
awareness of what data is essential to such analysis, as well as, of
course, the availability of that data in reliable form. 24 Because the
analysis necessarily involves a determination of the merit of the corporation's securities in relation to that of other companies in the
same industry-calling for considerable familiarity with the industry
as a whole 25-some firms are of the opinion that a skilled securities
analyst could not responsibly originate recommendations about securities in more than two industries.26 Firms whose research departments are organized around analysts whose responsibilities are
limited in this way also require that all recommendations originate
with, or have the approval of, the analyst responsible for the industry
of which the issuer is a part.27 Such opinion and conduct, however,
are at one extreme of the spectrum. The vast bulk of advisory recommendations were found to originate under other circumstances.
In some broker-dealer firms one or two men supply advice in response to a steady flow of requests from a large number of salesmen
while at the same time supplying the content of one or more advisory
22. The investigative approach used is summarized in id. at 333-34.
23. Id. at 144-45, 344, 348-49, 351-53, 356-58, 360-66, 369-74, 384-86. There was also
a disparity between standards professed and the practices followed. Id. at 384.
24. Id. at 344. For a contrast in analytical approach, see id. at 351-53.
25. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
26. Special Study 353. See also id. at 351.
27. Id. at 353, 365; cf. id. at 144-45.
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publications.28 Their recommendations, necessarily, are based to a
large extent upon printed advisory materials prepared by persons
outside the firm and upon occasional statements obtained from corporate insiders.29 In such firms, new and inexperienced employees
are assigned the task of sending replies to the salesmen who call or
wire for advice, while the limited staff of experienced and trained
analysts prepares detailed advisory reports for special classes of potential customers, such as institutional investors.30 Equally casual is
the manner in which such firms prepare the "portfolio analyses" for
customers who respond to invitations to submit their investments
for review.81 In many instances, as a matter of course, recommendations are formulated by salesmen from whatever materials and
information are at hand, without consulting even the firm's own
"research department." 32
Although less conspicuous, there are, according to the Study,
publishing firms with research personnel so few in number, in relation to the coverage and services offered, that only the most superficial examination is made of the stocks recommended. 33 While both
subscription publications and broker-dealers often treat the technical position of the market as an important factor in the timing
of a suggested change in investment position, the recommendations
of some publishing firms are based almost entirely upon this technical approach to market analysis, although this often is not made
apparent to the investor.34 This method of analysis makes possible
the issuance of countless recommendations despite extremely few
personnel.35
Hitting bottom, finally, at the other extreme of this advisory
conduct spectrum, the Study found that there are firms disseminating recommendations without any semblance of inquiry as to
the effect of current conditions on the issuer of the security.88
Usually this comes about because a firm has too few analysts to
maintain the steady flow of recommendations necessary to service
its publication or salesmen's demands. There are, however, conspicuous examples of such conduct during periods of great market
28. Id. at 144-45, 350-52, 358,384. See also the saga of Dunn Engineering, id. at 334-44.
29. Id. at 144, 351-55, 358, 384-85.
30. Id. at 145, 357-58, 374, 384.
31. Id. at 145, 245-46, 358, 384.
32. Id. at 142, 278, 285, 353.
33. Id. at ll63-67, !184-85.
ll4. Id. at !132-33, !148-49, !161-62, 366.
ll5. See especially id. at 363-65 on the wonders of this "crystal ball for looking
ahead."
!16. Id. at llll4-44, !163-65. See also note 24 supra.
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activity in speculative stocks, even among firms with well-staffed research facilities. 37
Characteristic of the printed materials and advertising of the
broker-dealer and publishing firms in all of the categories mentioned
was the assertion or suggestion that their advisory output was the
product of "research." 38
Somewhat paradoxically, the Study shows that the investors most
in need of responsible assistance receive it, in most instances, the
least. The larger institutional investors, who employ their own
expert advisory personnel, insist upon and receive detailed reports
from skilled securities analysts.39 Other investors, for the most part,
receive the brief conclusory recommendations formulated in the
manner mentioned above,40 with no hint as to the manner in which
they were originated.41
The existence of such striking disparities in advisory procedures
may be accounted for in several ways. Although the use of "research"
to obtain business is a "competitive necessity," 42 the costs of staffing
experienced, skilled personnel in adequate numbers is considerable.43 In such a situation, the nature of the advisory communication
makes it relatively easy, and tempting, to cut corners by using the
"research" product of over-extended and unqualified personnel.44
Any hesitation in economizing in this way, and any doubts about
the propriety of doing so, are likely to be fleeting when legal responsibilities are, as the Study noted, "cloudy."45 As a consequence, guidelines for the formulation and communication of market advice,
especially the former, are largely a matter of intra-firm standards.46
When these standards tolerate inexperienced, unsupervised personnel, indiscriminate use of unverified advisory "information," and
the favored treatment of certain categories of customers, the firm
is, after all, merely doing what most others do.
Broker-dealers, it is true, do profess concern for the impact of
the "suitability" rule at the communication stage.47 The "suitability,"
or "know-your-customer," rule of both the exchanges and the NASD
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See especially comments in Special Study 344; note 32 supra.
Special Study 248, 323, 352, 355-56, 367, 384. See also id. at 368-69, 379.
Special Study 357. See also note 30 supra.
Special Study 349, 357, 374. See also note 30 supra.
Special Study 349, 355-58, 384. See also note 34 supra.
Special Study 330-31, 344-45, 350, 351, 383.
See notes 27-30 supra and note 45 infra.
See notes 28-31 supra.
Special Study 386. See also id. at 356 n.253.
See note 23 supra.
Special Study 298-99.
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requires that the salesman select for recommendation a stock that
is suitable for a person in the financial position of the customer.48
Developed to control abuses in the selling practices of securities
salesmen, this rule has not been thought of as imposing standards
of skill and care in securities analysis, although it is perhaps logically
susceptible to such an extension.49
The picture which emerges from the Special Study findings is
one of vast advisory activity by both the competent and the incompetent, who work in many cases for seriously understaffed firms that
are attempting to respond to the competitive need to keep up a constant flow of recommendations. This takes place in an atmosphere
conspicuously lacking in standards for advisory conduct; it is hardly
surprising that investors150 and, although the extent is not easy to
gauge, the economy151 suffer.
IV.

CONTROLS FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION AT THE

TIME

OF THE

SEC SPECIAL STUDY

The Study shows unmistakably that a great deal of inexcusably
irresponsible advice comes from those in the advisory business. Why
isn't this prevented, either by the competitive forces of the market
place or by regulation? 152
Competitive forces seem to have little effect. One probable reason is that the results of investment advice are so intermixed with
cyclical trends that few investors can tell whether they were irresponsibly advised or whether they were caught in a disaster which
wisdom would not have avoided. Another reason may be the complexity of the advisory process itself. In any event, nearly everyone
seems to concede that regulation is necessary; the question arises as to
why it is not more effective. I will survey the three principal instruments of regulation under these headings: self-regulatory organizations; federal regulation; and state securities legislation and the common law of fraud.
48. Id. at 298-99. In the case of the NYSE it is referred to as the "know your
customer rule." NYSE Rule 405(1), CCH NYSE GUIDE 1[ 2405 (1960); see Special Study
315-16.
49. See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, (1965) DUKE L.J. 445; with respect to the current furor in the "suitability"
area, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 44, col. 7.
50. Special Study 269-72, 324-26, 342-44, 386.
51, Id. at 9-11, 386.
52, There were, of course, notable illustrations of sound research and advisory
practices with desirable competitive results. See id. at 353, 365.
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A. The Self-Regulatory Organizations
The memberships of the self-regulatory organizations-the exchanges and the NASD--comprise, for the most part, individuals
and firms who do not sell advice; they are in the business of selling
stocks. These organizations quite obviously view the advisory activities of member firms as a free, fringe service in a selling operation,
and consider the quality of the advice offered to be largely a matter
of individual firm standards. 53 They do, however, accept some responsibility for peripheral matters: there are rules and guidelines
to prevent abuses in connection with discretionary accounts, 54 to
prevent violation of the "suitability rule," 55 and to prevent the use
of lurid, flamboyant, or factually misleading language in printed
advisory materials, newspaper ads, and the like, which are referred
to by the self-regulatory organizations as "advertising materials." 66
While these rules and guidelines have had a wholesome impact
upon the communication stage of investment advice, the Special
Study findings point up the remarkable extent to which they leave
untouched certain aspects of the advisory process important to the
quality of the advisory output. 57
The rules and guidelines of these self-regulating groups are
policed by periodic examinations of the printed advisory materials
used by the members and by the investigation of public complaints. 58
The very infrequent disciplinary proceedings dealing with advisory
activities are almost entirely concerned with such infractions as factual inaccuracy and the recommendation of "unsuitable" securities. 59
In addition, the inspection of printed materials provokes occasional
general criticism as to their content. 60 Although under a statutory
mandate imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 193461 to assure
"just and equitable principles of trade," these groups simply have
not acknowledged their responsibility for the quality of what passes
as investment advice. 62 The enormous increase in recent years both
in the volume of advisory activity and in its use to get business has
brought with it no change in attitude. 63 Certainly there seems to
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 379 (NYSE), 380 (NASD).
Id. at 309, 315.
Id. at 298-99, 311-12, 315, 320. See also note 49 supra.
Special Study 244, 316, 376-81.
See Special Study 385-86; note 29 supra.
Special Study 377-79, 308-21.
Id. at 309-13, 320-21, 376-81.
See note 56 supra.
Exchange Act §§ 6b, 15A(b)8; 2 Loss 1176, 1363-78.
Special Study 145, 158, 379, 385-86.
Ibid. Figures as to growth may be found in id. at 21, 244-48, 330-31.
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be an inconsistency between this "hands-off" approach and other
official activities of the self-regulatory organizations, such as suggesting that member firms use "research" to attract business and
distributing to them advertising material urging the relatively unsophisticated investor to "Buy a Share in America." 64
B. Federal Regulation

A good deal more important are the federal controls. In a comprehensive scheme one might expect to find controls undertaking
each of the following: (I) the determination of who may engage in
advisory activity ("entry standards"); (2) the prohibition of certain
acts and practices; (3) the assurance of access by the public to information needed in securities analysis; and (4) the establishment
of general standards for advisory conduct.
Entry standards require little comment: at the time of the Special
Study the entry threshold was very low, particularly in the advice
area. 65 Prohibited acts and practices are of limited present significance, 66 except perhaps with respect to advertising conduct by those
selling advice. 67 Federal regulation relies most heavily on the other
nvo types of controls: the imposition of reporting requirements on
security issuers, and the development of general standards for advisory conduct. The former is the subject of much consideration
elsewhere, 68 while the latter has become the target of the SEC's socalled "anti-fraud rules." This development will be dealt with m
some detail.

I. Background
At a very early stage the SEC seems to have decided that simply
to prohibit specific practices considered deceptive or fraudulent was
not enough.69 There was need of a framework for the development
and implementation of "general standards," 70 presumably compa64. As to the former, see id. at 244-45, 379; as to the latter, see id. at 246. See also
note 63 supra.
65. Special Stud,• 145, 158. See also id. at 125, 142. This subject is given considerably
more attention in the text accompanying note 279 infra.
66. Special Study 375-76; with respect to other types of conduct, see id. at 302-08.
See also Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of
Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 691,
698 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Cohen & Rabin].
67. Special Study 381-83. But see id. at 367-69.
68. l Loss 159-78; with respect to reporting requirements under the 1964 amendments, see BAKER & CARY, CORPORATIONS 9-12 (Supp. 1965).
69. Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939). See also Mac Robbins & Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 3 Guly 11, 1962).
70. See Cohen & Rabin 702-03.
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rable to those developed in the professions,71 where the norms of
conduct call for special competence and have considerable ethical
content. 72 The SEC has sought to develop what it refers to as "professional standards" for investment advisers by elaboration of the
"fraud" notion. 73 That it should at the outset have adopted this
approach is not surprising: while the federal securities legislation
did not give an express mandate to establish standards for advisory
conduct, and while it was not at all clear that the SEC would be
on firm ground in insisting that the self-regulatory organizations
adopt them, 74 the SEC was, on the other hand, given extensive jurisdiction with respect to "fraud." 75
The approach the SEC has followed is grounded in three sections of the securities acts76 which, in broad, and for the most part
vague, language about misrepresentation and manipulation prohibit
what the SEC and the courts habitually refer to as fraud. 77 Using
its rule-making authority, the SEC has adopted a rule containing
much the same language.78 It usually enforces these statutory provisions and this rule in quasi-judicial proceedings in which it writes
opinions stating its findngs and conclusions. In its opinions, it customarily relies upon these three statutory sections and this rule
collectively, referring to them as the "anti-fraud provisions." 79
One must tum to this "administrative common law" to get an
insight into the de';elopment of general standards of conduct relat71. See in this connection, A Symposium on Professional Negligence, 12 VAND. L.
R.Ev. 535 (1959).
72. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 476 (1934). See also Special Study 240-42
(discussing "professionalism') and 237-38; Cohen &: Rabin 702-05; text accompanying
note 85 infra. For suggestions that "fraud" does not encompass all forms of unethical
conduct, see Herrick, Waddell&: Co., 25 S.E.C. 437, 445-46 (1947); Valley Forge Sec. Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7055, at 4 (Apr. 12, 1963).
73. Special Study 238-42; Cohen &: Rabin 702-03; Levin &: Evan, Professionalism and
the Stock Broker, 21 .Bus. LAw. 337 (1966).
74. While the responsibilities of the self-regulatory groups are couched in broad
and sweeping terms (see generally 2 Loss 1168-72, 1359-64, 1387, and Cohen &: Rabin 707)
and there are sweeping statements concerning the SEC's rule-making authority as to selling practices (see Cohen &: Rabin 696-98), the SEC has approached the "general standards" problem from a "fraud" perspective. See Special Study 375; Cohen &: Rabin 702,
Perhaps this explains the assumed need for new legislation to implement certain of the
Special Study recommendations. See notes 279 &: 296 infra.
75. Cohen &: Rabin 696, 702.
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 17a, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Act]; Exchange Act §§ 10b &: 15c.
77. See opinions cited in the several subsections which follow. See also Cohen &:
Rabin 702, 696. For a discussion of the sections and their differences, see 3 Loss 1421·
44; Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 2 n.5 CTuly 11,
1962).
78. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5. For a comparison of this Rule with the
other "fraud" provisions, see note 77 supra.
79. See note 77 supra.
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ing to investment advisers. 80 This development has been a gradual
one, and for the most part has taken place outside the courts; 81 during its course, a group of distinguishable regulatory theories or concepts have evolved from these anti-fraud provisions. It is the SEC's
practice to rely upon several of such theories in the same proceeding,
but for discussion purposes it is necessary to treat them separately. 82
Most of the proceedings have involved the broker-dealer firms, who
make no charge for most of their advice. However, the "anti-fraud
provisions" also apply to those offering advice £or a fee. 83

2. Failure to Deal "Fairly" and in Accordance
with "Standards of the Profession"
The fraud theories which might at first blush appear to have the
broadest effect in the development of standards of conduct might be
called "Shingle Theory No. 1" and "Shingle Theory No. 2." As the
Commission has stated in numerous opinions, those who offer investment advice (and who thus, as it were, hang out a "shingle," as professional men have been known to do), thereby hold themselves out
to be advisers who will deal "£airly" 84 (Shingle Theory No. 1), and
who will adhere to the "standards of the profession" to which they
belong8 5 (Shingle Theory No. 2). Failure to deal "fairly" or to meet
80. See generally FRIENDLY, Tm: FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-THE NEED FOR
l3E1TER DEFINmON oF STANDARDS (1962); l3aker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc ApproachWhich Should It Be?, 22 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB, 658 (1957); Cary, Administrative
Agencies and the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB.
653 (1964).
81. See text accompanying notes 154 & 184 infra. Compare Cohen & Rabin 695,
710-14. See also MUNDHEIM, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 80-81 (1965).
82. While the SEC often refers collectively to the "antifraud rules" (see note 79
supra), it is obvious, at least at the verbal level, that the various rules embody
different theories. But where, as is often the case, the SEC relies upon several of the

rules in condemning the course of conduct in question, it is difficult to determine
the extent to which the SEC is relying on any one rule. See Cohen &: Rabin 702-08.
See also Lesh, Federal Regulations of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers in Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1237 (1946), for a detailed examination of the early development
of several of these approaches with emphasis upon the "agency" or "fiduciary" theory.
83. See Anne Caseley Robin, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 149, at 3 (Sept. 10,
1963); Special Study 381-83; 3 Loss 1515-18. The question would be whether this group
owes a "higher duty." See text accompanying note 99 infra.
84. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 14 (Nov.
12, 1965). See also Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020,
at 4 (Feb. 11, 1963); Harold Grill, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6989 Gan. 8,
1963); N. Pinsker & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, at 6 (Oct. 21, 1960);
Barnett & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, at 4 CTuly 5, 1960); Cohen &
Rabin 703.
85. Illustrative cases are Mac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6846, at 3 Guly 11, 1962); Best Sec., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, at 3
O"une 3, 1960); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959). See also Carl J.
Bleidung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958); Cohen & Rabin 703.
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"standards of the profession" is "fraud." The two theories often are
lumped together in discussing a finding of fraud, but in numerous
instances are relied upon individually.86
The shingle theories are considered to have met with judicial
approval in the Charles Hughes case decided in 1943,87 one of two
key court opinions upon which the SEC customarily relies to support its fraud approach in the securities field generally. 88 There, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming the SEC's
revocation of a broker-dealer's registration, accepted the SEC's contention that the sale of securities by a dealer acting as principal
(rather than as agent) carried with it an implied representation that
the price was reasonably related to the prevailing market price. In
this situation, a dealer who solicits business "holds itself out as competent to advise in the premises," 89 and if the price is unreasonably
in excess of market price there has been both "an omission to state
86. In some instances the conduct is said to be "neither fair nor in accordance with
the standards of the profession." See, e.g., :Best Sec., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 6282 CTune 3, 1960). (Emphasis added.) Where a "standard" is available (see text
accompanying note 273 infra), the two notions, "standard" and "fairness," may be
coupled. See cases cited note 85 supra. :But where, as is often the case, there is no "industry standard" to point to, the emphasis is upon "fairness." See, e.g., Heft, Kahn &:
Infante, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, at 4 (Feb. II, 1963); Harold
Grill, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6989 Gan. 8, 1963); Barnett&: Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, at 4 CTuly 5, 1960); Leonard Burton Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, at 5 (June 4, 1959). In this connection, see Cohen
&: Rabin 703 ("will deal fairly with his customers in accordance with the standards of the
professions"). (Emphasis added.) However, in some of the situations in the cited opinions
"standards" are now available. See text accompanying note 273 infra.
While at the outset the SEC did not trace the origin of the "fairness" notion to the
role of "fairness" in the activities of the self-regulatory groups, see Duker &: Duker, 6
S.E.C. 386 (1939), today it might call attention to the National Association of Securities
Dealers' "Rules of Fair Practice." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NA•
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, art. III, § 1, at D-5 ("a member, in
the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade"). The SEC might also find this approach awkward
because of reference to the Association's "Interpretations" which read as follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also recognized that brokers and
dealers have an obligation of fair dealing in actions under the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Federal securities laws. The Commission bases this obligation on
the principle that when a securities dealer opens his business he is, in effect, representing that he will deal fairly with the public. Certain of the Commission's cases
on fair dealing involve practices not covered in the foregoing illustrations.
Id. at G-9. See also MuNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 75-90; note 72 supra.
87. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944). For a valuable examination of this and earlier Commission action in the
fraud area, see Lesh, supra note 82, at 1255. A recent summary by the SEC of the "shingle" theory appears in Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846,
at 2 Quly 11, 1962).
88. See, e.g., Mac Robbins &: Co., supra note 87, at 3. See also Cohen &: Rabin 703.
For the other leading case, see text accompanying note 184, infra.
89. 139 F.2d at 436-37. In this connection the court drew attention to the "confidence
•.• established" as a result of the adviser's "expert knowledge and proffered advice." Id.
at 437.
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a material fact and a fraudulent device" 90 within the language of the
anti-fraud rules. The court noted the SEC's reliance upon NASD
rules, as well as upon certain interpretations of state "Blue Sky"
legislation, in determining what mark-up is reasonable. 91 Most significantly, the court cited SEC opinions dealing with mark-ups in
which the SEC had spoken of "the vital representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with standards of
the profession." 92 It may be doubted whether the court in referring
to these decisions intended to endorse this vague and sweeping statement of the obligations of those in the securities business. 93 Indeed,
it appears that the SEC itself was unwilling to push the notion too
far at the outset. 94 Whatever the intent, it is abundantly clear that
the SEC considered Hughes to have given judicial approval to these
"shingle" theories. 95
This is not the place for an exhaustive examination of these two
interesting fraud concepts. 96 In addition to their effect on investment
advice they have played a major role in SEC control of broker-dealer
conduct. 97 In the advice area they have been obstacles which might
have deterred the less optimistic. The SEC's own opinions have been
the principal source of "fairness" norms; no productive outside source
has appeared to give substance to Shingle Theory No. I. Moreover, the
dearth of industry "standards" (particularly with respect to the formulation stage of the advisory process), 98 already noted in the discussion of the Special Study findings, 99 might have been a handicap
in the use of Shingle Theory No. 2. Yet the absence of "industry" or
90. Id. at 437.
91. Id. at 436 n.l.
92. Duker &: Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939), used the quoted phrase. See also Guar•
anty Underwriters, Inc., 14 S.E.C. 271, 280 (1943).
93. See text accompanying note 136 infra.
94. Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1057 (1941). For other early and interesting versions,
sec Lawrence R. Leehy, 13 S.E.C. 499, 505 (1943) (''.because of the confidential relationship between dealer and client we have repeatedly regarded .• .'); Trost &: Co., 12
S.E.C. 531, 535 (1942) ("decent standards'); William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 622
(1942) ("when a dealer is aware that such is not the case, the representation is fraudu-

lent').
95. See note 88 supra. See also l\fUNDHEI!lf, supra note 81, at 75-90.
96. Compare the discussion of "professional obligations" of other groups in A Symposium on Professional Negligence, supra note 71.
97. See illustrations in l\fac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846,
at 3 Guly 11, 1962); Cohen & Rabin 704-08.
98. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The "suitability" rule is an example of a
well-established standard in the selling practice area upon which both the SEC and the
industry rely. See text accompanying notes 47 & 48 supra. See also Barnett & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, at 4 Guly 5, 1960); Best Sec. Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, at 3 Gune 3, 1960).
99. See text accompanying notes 18 & 46 supra.

1584

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1569

"fairness" standards does not seem to have embarrassed the SEC; 100
rather, it has found it possible to find violations of these theories in
situations where an impartial observer might have thought that none
was identifiable or discernible, and where the conduct complained
of was merely a failure to meet minimum standards in evaluating
and recommending stocks.101
These fraud theories suggest a fundamental jurisdictional problem which also arises in connection with other theories to be discussed later: To what extent is the SEC justified in undertaking to
develop general professional standards by manipulation of the concept of fraud? 102 As the SEC seems to recognize,103 standards which
afford adequate investor protection must speak to care and skill, as
well as to ethics. The former are elements of due care which the
law of negligence imposes upon professionals and persons undertaking tasks requiring special skills.104 The dual nature of this obligation of due care is emphasized by those concerned with the problems
of professional responsibility, as the following statement by Dean
John Wade, an authority in the field, indicates:
In determining whether an ordinary individual is negligent in
causing injury to another, the standard of care is usually expressed
in a simple fashion by speaking of what a reasonably prudent
person would do under similar circumstances. The standard in the
case of an attorney [or accountant] is somewhat more complicated.
It is composed of at least two elements and possibly three. The first
has to do with the care and diligence which he must exercise. The
second is concerned with the minimum degree of skill and knowledge which he must display. The third may involve an additional
skill which he may himself possess.105
100. On occasion the SEC has shown a willingness to look around. See Richmond
Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4584 (Feb. 27, 1963) (scholarly writings; testimony of
leaders of large firms as to what is required by "fair" dealing); William J. Stelmack
Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 621-24 (1942) (state legislation; National Association of Securities
Dealers' "Rules of Fair Practice"-with respect to the latter, see note 87 supra). See also
Duker &: Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939) (state and federal decisions; treatises on
trust law); MUNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 75-90; note 290 infra.
101. See, e.g., Shearson, Hammill &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at
18 (Nov. 12, 1965); Alexander Reid&: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, at
5 n.10 (Feb. 8, 1962). Contributing to the analytical problems in this area is the SEC's
custom of relying upon several fraud theories in condemning the conduct in question
without disclosing the degree to which they are relying on any specific theory. Illustrative of this tactic is N. Pinsker &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, at 6-8
(Oct. 21, 1960).
102. The SEC makes no bones about its objectives. Cf. Valley Forge Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7055, at 3 (Apr. 12, 1963). See also Cohen &: Rabin 702-03.
103. See particularly text accompanying notes 119 &: 156 infra.
104. A Symposium on Professional Negligence, supra note 71, at 762. See also Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797,
812-21 (1959).
105. A Symposium on Professional Negligence, supra note 71, at 762, (Emphasis
added.)
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By reading into the advisory communication an implied assertion that due care and skill have been used-and that this is what
is being done comes through more clearly in the consideration of
other fraud theories106-negligence is made to equal fraud. The
propriety of this has vexed the common law since Derry v. Peeks. 107
How far may the SEC go in this direction, when it was not given
an express mandate to establish or implement standards, but was
rather given jurisdiction only to prevent and to act against deceptive
conduct and manipulation? The answer to this question is, of course,
a matter of statutory interpretation. But when, as here, legislative
history is not very helpful, 108 Derry v. Peeks lurks in the background,109 as the SEC, on occasion, appears to be aware.110 The
question that case raised and answered in the negative is whether
a common-law fraud action will lie for misrepresentation in the
absence of proof of a conscious knowledge ("scienter") that the statement complained of was untrue.111 A good many common-law courts
have gotten around Derry v. Peeks by treating indifference to the
correctness of the assertion as adequate to prove scienter. 112 In some
cases where negligent misrepresentation is complained of courts
have been able to avoid the scienter problem by allowing the pending action to sound in "negligence" rather than in "fraud,"113 a
technique seemingly not available to the SEC. There are, however,
courts which have been willing to treat negligence as fraud, an approach which has been criticized as unwisely confusing two areas
of the law having different origins and different underlying policy
considerations.114 When this question of the need to prove scienter
106. See text accompanying notes 119 8: 156 infra.
107. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). For a recent discussion of the Derry v. Peek problem,
see Hawkins, supra note 104, at 818-21.
108. See 3 Loss 1430-44; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporations by Implication Through Rule IOb-.5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964). See also
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities A.ct, 48 YALE L.J. 227, 234-42 (1933).
109. See, e.g., 3 Loss 1444. See also text accompanying note 220 infra.
UO. See Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 4 n.16
Ouly ll, 1962); Alexander Reid 8: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 672:1, at 5
(Feb. 8, 1962). It was, perhaps, less of a problem in some of the earlier opinions where
the point is made that the conduct is "knowingly undertaken." E.g., Guaranty Under'l'.Titers, Inc., 14 S.E.C. 271,280 (1943); W. K. Archer, 11 S.E.C. 635, 645 (1942): William
J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 621-22 (1942): Duker Be Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 889 (1939).
See also note 171 infra.
III. See Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1926). See also note 150 infra.
II2. See PROSSER, TORTS 719-24 (3d ed. 1964).
ll3. Ibid. See also Hawkins, supra note 104, at 812-21; Shulman, supra note 108, at
2!14-35.

114. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or
Fraud1, 18 VA. L. REY. 703 (1932); Shulman, supra note 108, at 235. As Professor Bohlen
points out, problems arise in several areas, e.g., burden of proof, contributory negligence as a defense, and the right to punitive damages.
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has arisen in cases where an individual asserts a private cause of action based upon the anti-fraud provisions under discussion, the
courts have not been able to agree.115
There is, of course, abundant authority for the general, and
vague, proposition that the anti-fraud provisions were not intended
to limit the SEC's jurisdiction to conduct fraudulent at common
law. 116 Beyond that, about all that can be said with certainty is that
there are judicial indications that the SEC is not free to define
"fraud" so as to proscribe any conduct it deems reprehensible,11 7 a
proposition with which the SEC on occasion seems to agree. 118 Yet,
as will be seen, there are an increasing number of proceedings in
which negligence in advisory conduct is found to violate the "antifraud rules."
3. Absence of an "Adequate and Reasonable" Basis
Particularly in the situation where the allegedly fraudulent statement was a "prediction" or "favorable recommendation," the SEC
has used another formula which I shall call "Shingle Theory No. 3":
there is an implied representation that an "adequate" or "reasonable" basis exists for the statement.119 When there is no adequate
or reasonable basis, "fraud" can be avoided, if at all,120 only by disclosure of information about the risks involved.
In several opinions dealing with this subject, the SEC had used
language s-µggesting that fraud resulted from a failure to evaluate
properly and disclose "known facts which make a prediction dangerous and unreliable" 121 or, possibly even where such facts if not
"known," were "easily ascertainable." 122 In more recent opinions,
115. See text accompanying note 218 infra.
116. See 3 Loss 1430-44 and authorities cited therein.
117. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
118. See note 111 supra and text accompanying note 290 infra.
119. Earlier decisions speak of what the prediction "implied." E.g., Leonard Burton
Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, at 4 (June 4, 1959). But later opinions
add language reminiscent of that found in Shingle Theories 1 and 2: "inherent in the
dealer-customer relationship [is] the implied representation • . . that representations
respecting a stock ... are reasonably made on the basis of knowledge and careful consideration." Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, at 4
(Feb. 11, 1963). See also Alexander Reid, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, at 5
(Feb. 8, 1962); MuNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 75-90; Cohen & Rabin 704.
120. There have been suggestions that "disclosure" will not, in all cases, avoid
"fraud." See Cohen & Rabin 703.
121. Leonard Burton Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, at 4 (June 4,
1959).
122. N. Pinsker & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, at 6 (Oct. 21, 1960);
Barnett & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, at 4 (July 5, 1960); Best Sec.,
Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, at 4 (June 3, 1960).
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such as In re Mac Robbins, 123 a change in emphasis is discernible.
This case is interesting, also, because it shows the trouble even sophisticated courts have with the theory, particularly when, as is the
SEC's wont, the theory is intenvoven with several others. 124
In l\fac Robbins, highly optimistic statements were made orally
and in distributed brochures about an issuer in the bowling industry.
No mention was made of the fact that the issuer was operating at a
loss. The SEC found that the statements violated the "anti-fraud"
provisions because they were made without "an adequate and
reasonable basis" for them. 125 Several Mac Robbins' salesmen were
made parties to the proceeding, including a Mr. Berko and a Mr.
Kahn whose conduct was found to be the "cause" of the revocation of
Mac Robbins' registration. 126 The principal charge against Kahn
seems to have been that there was no "adequate basis" for "optimistic
statements as to stock of a new company without disclosing there
was no information available as to whether it has operating profits
or losses at the time." 127 The record showed that accounting figures
as to the financial condition of the issuer were not available when
Kahn made the objectionable statements. 128 Thus, the critical "omission" was failure to reveal pertinent but unavailable information
rather than, as in earlier opinions, "known or easily ascertainable
facts." 120
Berka, the SEC stated, "predicted Sports would rise [from 7] to
15 within a year" when there "was no adequate basis for this statement because Sports, a firm in business for approximately one year,
was suffering initial operating losses. Petitioner should have known
of the losses and disclosed them." 130 Unlike the findings with respect
to facts available when Kahn acted, the record indicated that finan123. The proceeding was before both the SEC and the courts on two occasions. Cita•
tions to the various stages are found in their chronological treatment in the text.
124. See cases cited note 82 supra.
125. Mac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462 (Feb. 6, 1961).
126. Id. at IO.
127. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1961). The other had to do with "com•
parisons" of the securities of the subject issuer with those of other corporations. Id. at
II4.
128. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1961).
129. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
130. Berke v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1961). In the court's summary of the
SEC's "ultimate conclusion" ("or they were grossly careless or indifferent as to the
existence of an adequate basis .. .'), it appears to have lost sight of the interesting dis•
tinction which the SEC makes between conduct which is "fraud" and a finding that
the violations were "willful" within the meaning of § 15b of the Securities Exchange
Act. Mac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, at 8 n.22 (Feb. 6,
1961); 2 Loss 1307-12.
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cial statements were available when Berko made the predictions in
question.131
Both Kahn and Berka appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In its argument to that court, the SEC pressed the
contention that its fraud findings were justified because of the
"boiler-room" nature of the selling and advisory activity in question132 even though its opinion had strongly emphasized the "absence of an adequate or reasonable basis" theory.133 The court, in
remanding both cases to the SEC for clarification, rejected the SEC
decision, asserting that "affirmance of its findings and reasoning
would establish a rule applicable to all sales of securities."134 It
added this admonition: "Basically, its [the SEC's] goal should be
clarification of the legal duties imposed on salesmen involved in
operations such as Mac Robbins, Inc." 185
Judge Charles Clark, who wrote for the court in Charles Hughes
(the original "shingle" case),136 concurred in the remand of both
appeals in an opinion in which he stated: 137
Basically the question is the extent to which it would press the conclusion of fraud which we supported in Charles Hughes & Co. v.
S.E.C. . . . The Commission is relying on the so-called "shingle"
theory to establish statutory fraud. The essence of this theory is that
in certain circumstances one who sells securities to the public-who
hangs out his shingle-implicitly warrants the soundness of statements of stock value, estimates of a firm's earnings potential, and the
like. When such a person conceals known information inconsistent
with this "implicit warranty of soundness" he has omitted a material
fact without which the statements made would be misleading. See
3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1490 (2 ed. 1961). One element of this
warranty, the Commission held below, is that all such statements,
or at least highly optimistic ones, have an "adequate basis." If the
salesman makes statements, knowing they had no adequate basis, or
if he is "grossly careless or indifferent to the existence of an adequate
basis" for his statements, then he has violated the anti-fraud provisions, principally § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 779(a)(2).
Despite protestations to the contrary, 138 Judge Clark's recapitula131. Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1961).
132. 297 F.2d 116, 117; 297 F.2d 112, 113.
133. Mac Robbins 8: Co., Securities E....::change Act Release No. 6462, at 6-7 (Feb. 6,
1961). The "boiler-room" aspect appears on page 8 of the opinion.
134. 297 F.2d 116, 118. See also 297 F.2d 112, 113.
135. 297 F.2d 116, 119. See also 247 F.2d 112, 114.
136. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
137. 297 F.2d 112, 115.
138. Cohen 8: Rabin 711 n.156. See also Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6864, at 2-4 (Feb. 6, 1961).
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tion of the "shingle" theory must have caused some concern in the
SEC.139 By requiring "knowledge" of "no adequate basis" or "gross
carelessness or indifference," the ordinary negligent misrepresentation does not constitute fraud; this keeps the fraud concept largely
in line with common-law authorities.140 However, the SEC has often
failed to make clear that it was basing its "fraud" conclusion upon
a finding of the kind required by Judge Clark.141
Following the remand by the court, the SEC again considered
the charges; it departed from its earlier approach and, incorporating
the argument it had pressed in the Court of Appeals, wrote an opinion which emphasized the "boiler-room" nature of the operation
involved, indicating that it violated Shingle Theory No. 1.142 At
the same time, the SEC managed to convey the idea that it was not
modifying or pulling back from its earlier position as to Shingle
Theory No. 3. It even stated that, apart from the boiler-room aspects
of the activities of Kahn and Berko, a violation of the "adequate or
reasonable basis" rule was shown because of their oral recommendations; no mention was made of the type of findings alluded to by
Judge Clark.143
Only Berko appealed, and the court affirmed. 144 In an opinion
not a model of clarity, it agreed with the SEC that a "higher duty
to prospective customers" was owed where, as here, a "boiler-room"
rather than a legitimate sales operation was involved, emphasizing
in this connection the finding that Berko was aware of the "boilerroom" nature of the firm's activity.145 The court also noted that
Berko could have ascertained the firm's financial situation from
139. This exposition from this particular source could hardly have failed to influence those who decided not to accept the court's challenge and squarely raise the
question of how far one can go along the "fraud" route. In any case, the opinion on
remand took refuge in the "boiler-room" aspect of the proceeding. See text accompanying note 142 infra.
140. See text accompanying note 108 supra. Compare MUNDHEIM, supra note 81, at
77-78. See also notes 174 &: 222 infra.
141. See, e.g., Crow, .Brourman &: Chatkin, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7839 (Mar. 15, 1966); Arnold Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7813 (Feb.
7, 1966). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962); Cohen
&: Rabin 704-05.
142. Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6864, at 4-6, 11-12
(Feb. 6, 1961). See also MUNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 89-90.
143. See id. at 12-15 (part "V" of the opinion).
144. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
145. Id. at 142. See also MUNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 89-90.
146. Id. at 142-43.
147. See text accompanying note 135 supra. The court did use language which suggests a negligence standard but carefully limited its reasoning to the "boiler-room"
context: "He studied, mailed out, and utilized brochures which he should have known
and, on proper study, could have determined were deceptive and misleading." 316 F.2d
137, 142.
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available financial statements, and, furthermore, could have readily
determined that the brochures he distributed contained misleading
statements. 146 Clearly, no "clarification of legal duties" of those engaging in advisory conduct, such as the court might have envisaged
when it sent the case back to the SEC, came out of this litigation. 147
In an opinion written shortly after its first opinion in Mac Robbins,148 as well as in several later opinions, 149 the SEC used this "adequate or reasonable basis" approach in a manner which shows even
more clearly that advisers can only meet the requirements of the test
by the use of diligence and skill in security analysis. Recently, the
SEC characterized the implications of this approach in these terms:
"that, as a prerequisite [to the avoidance of fraud], he [the adviser]
shall have made a reasonable investigation." 150 Also, in what might
be called a "shingle on a shingle" theory, it has suggested that Shingle
Theory Nos. I and 2 encompass an implied representation that
Shingle Theory No. 3 has been satisfied.151
What this seems to come down to is this: the SEC, when it invokes
this theory, will decide whether an investment adviser, adhering to
the not too clearly delineated standard of diligence and skill in discovering, analyzing, and evaluating data about a stock of the type
recommended, would have said what was said. 152 Thus, a theory
which at the outset seems to have been concerned with the fraud
notion of "half-truths"-statements which are misleading because
of failure to disclose known facts-has evolved with little explanation
148. Alexander Reid & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727 (Feb. 8, 1962).
149. Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at
9 (Mar. 15, 1966); Shearson, Hammill & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743,
at 19-20 (Nov. 12, 1965). The cited materials refer to advisory conduct of individual
salesmen. The opinions, of course, have numerous other aspects and involve other fraud
approaches. See note 82 supra.
150. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3, Feb. 2, 1962. See also Cohen &:
Rabin to the same effect.
151. See Mac Robbins &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 4 CTuly
11, 1962); Alexander Reid&: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, at 5 (Feb. 8,
1962). See also Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7113,
at 5 (Aug. 8, 1963) ("absent such [adequate] basis, he violated his duty to deal fairly
with customers and his implied representation is fraudulent").
In some instances, the SEC has stated that the adviser must have "actual knowledge"
of pertinent facts, a test likely to cause some problems for securities analysts. D. F.
Bernheimer &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000 Gan. 23, 1963); Harold
Grill, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6989, at 4 Gan. 8, 1963); Alexander Reid &:
Co., supra at 5.
152. See cases cited note 149 supra. It seems abundantly clear that the "anti-fraud
rules" are not limited in their application to the "boiler-room" situation. Both the
cases on point and statements of SEC officials indicate a broader scope of applicability.
See Cohen & Rabin. But see MuNDHEIM, supra note 81, at 77-90; text accompanying
note 304 infra.
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into a broad standard in securities analysis. 153 It is indeed unfortunate that the SEC backed away from the court's invitation, in its
first Berka opinion, 154 to argue directly that this is a rule of broad
application imposing general duties of skill and diligence. Other
judicial treatment of the problem has been inconclusive. 155

4. Failure To Use "Reasonable Care"
A number of proceedings before the SEC have involved the
recommendation of stocks which either should have been registered
under the 1933 act, or which were registered.- Here the SEC has taken
the position that the "anti-fraud" provisions impose upon the firm
"a duty of reasonable care." 156 The SEC's 1953 decision, Charles E.
Bailey rb Co., 157 frequently relied upon in later decisions, 158 might
be taken as illustrative of this line of decisions in its early form. In
that proceeding, the SEC sought revocation of respondent's brokerdealer registration and a determination of whether several named
persons engaged in sales activity were the cause of a violation by the
registrant. Quite apart from the question of possible unlawful sale
of unregistered stock was the additional question of whether the
advisory conduct complained of violated the "anti-fraud provisions."150 The advisory conduct in question consisted of numerous
extravagant statements in both sales literature and oral representations aimed at inducing purchases of shares of a corporation which
had been operating at a loss and which was entering a new, untried
field. 160 The registrant offered as a defense to the inaccurate statements in the sales literature, and in exculpation from the statements
of its salesmen, "a preliminary investigation of issuer's affairs" made
by visiting its plant, and reliance upon "information furnished by
153. See Leonard .Burton Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, at 4
aune 4, 1959).
154. See note 130 supra.
155. SEC v. F. S. Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1962); see SEC v. R. A.
Holman & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 91,815 (2d Cir. 1966). See also SEC v. Van
Horn, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 91,850 (7th Cir. 1966); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199, 210 (9th Cir. 1959); Norris & Hirschberg, Inc. v. SEC,
177 F.2d 228,233 (D.C. Cir. 1949); SEC v. Broadwell Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
156. Illustrative are: Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7020, at 4-5 (Feb. II, 1963); Keith Richard Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5988, at 8 Guly 17, 1959); Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41-42 (1953).
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, Feb. 2, 1962 (application of antifraud rules generally to sale of, inter alia, unregistered securities).
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 35-43 (1953). Note that the registration
provision violation is considered at 43-44.
160. Id. at 36-42.
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the issuer on which registrant was entitled to rely." 161 In rejecting
the defense the SEC stated: "Such reliance did not constitute discharge of the duty to exercise reasonable care that rested on registrant as underwriter, or a defense to circulation of the materially
misleading and deficient statement ••••" 162
Opinions such as Bailey offer no clue as to the reasoning used
in finding that an obligation exists, or, for that matter, the criteria
for determining "reasonable care."168 In a recent opinion commenting upon Bailey, the SEC suggests that the basis for imposition of
such a standard is to be found in the "reasonable care" language of
sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.164 These sections
provide, inter alia, a private right of action against those making misrepresentations in registration statements or in the sale of stock required to be registered.165 The person proceeded against is given a
defense by the terms of those sections if he can show that, as to any
untrue or omitted fact, he had, "after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe" it to be true (section 11),
or with the exercise of "reasonable care could not have known" of
the untruth or omission (section 12).166 This language has been construed to impose liability for negligence in representations made
either in registration statements or the sale of stock required to be
registered.167 The SEC appears to feel that these sections also show
an intent to create a duty which it can enforce and which continues
for an indeterminate period after the initial sale of the stock;168 the
anti-fraud provisions, which have no comparable language and make
no reference to the sections mentioned, were, in the view of the SEC,
the intended means of its own implementation of this continuing
ducy.100
161. Id. at 41-42.
162. Id. at 42. Its conclusion of a violation of the anti-fraud provisions under discussion is found at 43.
163. In this connection, see text accompanying note 105 supra. For example, the
SEC apparently has not undertaken to build a record as to what a trained, experienced
securities analyst would have done iu this situation.
164. Richmond Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4584 (Feb. 27, 1963). With respect
to duties imposed upon others in this area, see Gearhart 8c Otis, Inc., Securities Ex.change Act Release No. 7329, at 27 (June 2, 1964) (duty of firms with board representa•
tion on the issuer); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., Securities Ex.change Act Re•
lease No. 7117 (Aug. 16, 1963) ("various relationships'').
16.5. Securities Act §§ 11 8c 12.
166. Id. at §§ ll(b)(3)(A)-(D) & 12(2).
167. See 3 Loss 1699•712 & 1724-27 and cases cited therein. The quoted language of
the two sections is compared at 1729-31.
168. Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, at 5
(Feb. 11, 1963) ("thereafter when it was conducting an active retail sales campaign" a
"special duty" existed).
169. See Richmond Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7329, at 7 (Feb. 27, 1963).
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Were underwriter obligations the subject of this paper, perhaps
some question might be raised concerning these obligations which
linger on. But what is of interest in considering advisory conduct
generally, is an apparent shedding of this underwriter chrysalis. In
recent proceedings not involving registration problems, the SEC has
begun to speak in terms of a duty of "due diligence and prudence,"
"a high degree of care," and "diligent inquiry." 170 Yet the characteristic chimerical qualities of the fraud theories reveal themselves in
this language, suggesting that this "duty" may, in turn, be subsumed
under one or another of the "shingle" theories. 171

5. Recklessness
"Recklessness" is another ground for a finding of fraud mentioned from time to time in SEC opinions. 172 This ground seems
more in step with developments in the area of common-law fraud
than the theories discussed earlier. 178 Proof of an "I don't care" state
of mind is a substitute for scienter even in most of the jurisdictions
which continue to follow Derry v. Peeks. 174 Although courts often
use "recklessness" ambiguously, reckless misrepresentation could be
accurately described as a state of mind in which there is an absence
of belief in or concern for the reliability of that which is asserted.175
The SEC may have had such a definition in mind at the outset: in
one of its earliest decisions it clearly indicated doubt as to whether
evidence of merely "careless misrepresentations" would permit the
finding of a violation of one of the statutory provisions upon which
the anti-fraud rules were based, but found the evidence adequate
There the SEC noted that other anti-fraud provisions ••• provide further standards
of conduct ••• which of course apply to underwriters." In the latter connection, see
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3-4 (Feb. 2, 1962).
170. Crow, Brourman & Chatkins, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839,
at 5 (Mar. 15, 1966) ("diligent inquiry''); Arnold Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7813, at 4 (Feb. 7, 1966) ("due diligence and prudence''); Investment Service
Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6884, at 7 (Aug. 15, 1962) ("a high degree of
care"); Anne Caseley Robin, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 149, at n.2 (Sept.
IO, 1963) ("high degree of care''); Special Study 375 (duty of "diligent inquiry," citing
Investment Service Co., supra).
171. Heft, Kahn&, Infante, Inc. Securities Act Release No. 7020, at 4 (Feb. 11, 1963);
Banner Sec., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6985, at 3 (Dec. 28, 1962) ("a
reasonable, responsible or careful fulfillment of the duty to deal fairly with investors'').
172. See note 82 supra.
173. PROSSER, ToRTS 715-16 (3d ed. 1964).
174. Id. at 716. See also Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J.
227, 234-41 (1933).
175. Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir.
1926); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 173, at 715-16.
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where the advisor "knew" statements were without factual warrant
and "recklessly failed" to ascertain the material facts. 176
More recently, in such cases as A. G. Bellin Sec. Corp. 177 decided
in 1959, a somewhat less precise use of "recklessness" appears. There,
salesmen employed by a broker-dealer firm recommended the purchase of stock of General Oil and Industries Company, basing their
favorable statements upon a brochure prepared by their own firm.
The brochure contained optimistic statements about the company's
prospects, but did not give, and the individual salesmen who used
it did not have, data as to its financial situation. Suspension of the
firm's broker-dealer registration was ordered for violation of the
"anti-fraud rules." The SEC, in its opinion, summarized the principal defense thus:
Registrant contends that its use of the brochure was proper, because
the information in it was obtained from a report on General distributed by Stratford Securities Co. Inc. ("Stratford"), a securities
dealer, from conversation with Josephson, who was General's counsel
and stated that the information in that report was correct, and from
a letter dated June 24, 1958, received from General, and was later
confirmed by letters received from General and by a report of registrant's attorney who visited Texas to check on General.178
The SEC, rejecting this defense, stated:
It is obvious that registrant's asserted reliance on the Stratford report,
Josephson's verification, and the glowing information supplied by
General was at least reckless and misplaced, and was not consistent
176. Foreman & Co., 3 S.E.C. 132 (1938) [finding a violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act where such "recklessness" was present (at 141-42) but not where there was only
"negligence" (at 138)]. It should be noted that while this opinion was principally concerned with whether there was a "wilful" violation (see note 130 supra), it does throw
some light on earlier SEC opinions as to what is necessary to show the requisite wilfulness. See, e.g., Berry & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6349, at 4 n.6 (Aug. 17,
1960).
177. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5966, May 18, 1959. See also, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 21 (Nov. 12, 1965); Alexander Reid & Co., Securities E.xchange Act Release No. 6272, at 4 (Feb. 8, 1962); N.
Pinsker & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, at 7 (Oct. 21, 1960). Some of
these cases also involved alleged violations of the registration provisions (see text accompanying note 156 supra). See also Mac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, at 6 (Feb. 6, 1961) (citing Bellin in finding a violation by salesmen who
were not themselves in violation of the registration provisions). With respect to the
latter point, see id. at 9.
There have also been references to "indifference to truth" and "gross negligence"
in connection with a finding of "wilfulness" in regard to the violation. Investment
Service Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6884, at 7 (Feb. 7, 1966); Mac Robbins
& Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, at 8 (Feb. 6, 1961); Best Sec., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, at 4 (June 3, 1960). See also note 130 supra.
178. A. G. Bellin Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5966, at 6-7 (May
18, 1959).
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with the existence of a responsible relationship between securities
dealer and customer.110

As was the case with opinions emphasizing "due care," 180 opinions like Bellin state no criteria for determining "recklessness," apart
from implying a circumstantial equation of "reckless" and "irresponsible."181 Certainly, "recklessness" appears to fall somewhat
short of requiring a finding of indifference to reliability.
So long as the standards discussed earlier are available to justify
findings of fraud, there is little need for reliance upon this approach.
Even so, it can serve a useful purpose in situations where a court
shows some hesitation in accepting the other fraud theories. 182 Moreover, it may be destined to play a much larger role in controlling
advisory conduct in the future, a possibility considered infra, in the
examination of the proposals for legislation made by the Special
Study Report. 183

6. "Fraud" Because of a "Fiduciary-Like" Relationship
The fiduciary approach received its judicial send-off in the
Arleen Hughes case. 184 The respondent Mrs. Hughes had numerous
clients with whom she had entered into written agreements stating
that she was to act as "principal" in transactions she recommended.
These agreements contained a schedule of rates and charges to be
paid which called for a slightly higher mark-up per transaction
(excess of price to customer over price at which the shares were available in the over-the-counter market) than was usual where a dealer
sells a security to a customer. She was, of course, registered both as
a broker-dealer and an investment adviser. The SEC sought revocation of the broker-dealer registration because of failure to make the
disclosures required of a "fiduciary." 185 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in 1949, in affirming the SEC's action ordering
revocation, stated that the record would support a finding of fraud
179. Id. at 7.
180. See note 156 supra. Compare Ala. Rule 26 § 10, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. ,i
5636.
181. For example, is testimony of those admittedly competent in the field appropriate? See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 766
(1959). "Irresponsible" has overtones of Shingle Theory No. 1. See text accompanying
note 84 supra.
182. See, e.g., the SEC's language in Alexander Reid & Co., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6727, at 4 (Feb. 8, 1962), concerning the holding adverse to the SEC in
SEC v. Rapp, 1957-61 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 91,048 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) which was subsequently reversed. SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1962).
183. See text accompanying note 296 infra.
184. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 3 Loss 1500-08.
185. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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on two grounds. One was common-law fraud based upon the presence
of what Mrs. Hughes admitted was a fiduciary relationship. 186 This
relationship created a duty of loyalty which was violated when she
"acted simultaneously in the dual capacity of investment adviser
and broker-dealer" without adequate disclosure.187 However, the
theory upon which the court stated that it was basing its finding
was not grounded in common-law principles of fraud and deceit
but upon violation of the "anti-fraud provisions," which were designed to apply "specialized and unique legal treatment" to the task
of suppressing the "subtle and involved forms" which fraud may
take in this area.188 Violation resulted from her failure to disclose
to her clients the best price at which the securities sold to clients
could have been bought in the open market, and the price which
she had actually paid for those she had sold to them. The court succinctly stated its reasoning in these terms:
These quoted words ["any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,"] as they appear
in the statute can only mean that Congress forbad not only the
telling of purposeful falsity but also the telling of half-truths and the
failure to tell the "whole truth." These statutory words were
obviously designed to protect the investing public as a whole whether
the individual investors be suspicious or unsuspecting. The best price
currently obtainable in the open market and the cost to the registrant are both material facts within the meaning of the abovequoted language and they are both factors without which informed
consent to a fiduciary's acting in a dual and conflicting role is
im possible.189
Although useful in establishing that persons whom the court termed
"admitted fiduciaries" have disclosure obligations imposed by the
"anti-fraud" provisions, there is nothing in the opinion to give much
help in tagging as a "fiduciary" a person who claims he is not.
There are, to be certain, many situations where application of
typical common-law principles would result in finding a fiduciary
relationship which results in the imposition of duties of care, skill,
and loyalty.190 But the spectrum of relationships in investment advice
fans out from this conventional fiduciary relationship to the situa186. Id. at 975. See also id. at 976.
187. Id. at 975.
188. Ibid.
189. Id. at 976.
190. See, e.g., Ramey Kelly Corp., Securities E.'Cchange Act Release No. 6209 (March
17, 1960). See also Special Study 252-53; :BOGERT, TRUSTS&: TRUSTEES §§ 481 &: 541 (2d ed.
1960); 3 Loss 1505-08.
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tion in which, at some stage, there is a "principal-agent" relationship
between the parties,191 then further to the contractual relationship
not involving agency (as where impersonal advice is paid for192 or
a principal sale is induced by sales literature),193 and, ultimately, to
the situation where the advice is relied upon without personal or
contractual dealings (as where the market letter of Firm X prompts
purchase of a recommended stock from Firm Y). 194 Very early in its
application of the anti-fraud rules, the SEC, in William]. Stelmack
Corp., 195 suggested that each of these, except perhaps the last, involves a relationship of "special trust and confidence, approaching
and perhaps even equaling that of a fiduciary." 196 Emphasizing the
reliance aspect, the Special Study stated: "Where the relationship
between the customer and broker is such that the former relies in
whole or in part on the advice and recommendations of the latter,
the salesman is, in effect, an investment adviser, and some of the
aspects of a fiduciary relationship arise between the two parties."197
Despite this broad language, it should be noted that, in contrast
to the SEC's approach under the other fraud theories, where it has
gone pretty far in the use of "fraud" to develop broad standards of
care and skill, the fiduciary theory has not been pushed toward its
outer limits.198 The common law, in dealing with numerous fiduciary relationships, imposes upon fiduciaries not only obligations
of loyalty, but also obligations of care and skill.199 So far the SEC
has not generally urged that the designation as a ":fiduciary," which
results from the duties of loyalty arising out of the "anti-fraud"
provisions, also entails the imposition, in pari passu, of the fiduciary's
required standard of skill.200 Although the SEC spoke in Arleen
191. For instance, where a market letter sent to a potential customer induces a purchase from the distributing firm which acts as agent. Most firms distribute these at least
weekly with this objective in mind. Special Study 844-45. See also note 7 supra.
192. For instance, where a subscription publication charges for its advice. Special
Study 859-60.
198. For instance, where a dealer with an inventory sends a market letter to a potential customer which induces a sale by the dealer, as principal, to the recipient. Special Study 848-50.
194. See, e.g., Special Study 841-42 (describing use of reprints of an advisory publication prepared by the analyst of a firm with a position in the stock).
195. 11 S.E.C. 601 (1942).
196. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601 (1942); Lawrence R. Leeby, 18 S.E.C.
499, 505 (1948).
197. Special Study 252-53.
198. See text accompanying notes 119 &: 156 supra. See also Cohen &: Rabin 703-04;
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 19!J4 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
28 GEO, WASH, L. REv. 214 (1959).
199. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 879 (1958); note 190 supra.
200. A fiduciary-like relationship was not emphasized in the numerous opinions
cited in the discussion of the other fraud theories. But see Ramey Kelly Corp., Secu-
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Hughes of the duty of "reasonable dilligence" as "a corollary of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty," 201 and, recently, of the "high degree
of care" required of one offering investment advisory services,202
the :fiduciary notion has been principally used where the conduct
complained of was thought to violate the fiduciary's duty of loyalty, 203
as, for instance, the "churning" of discretionary accounts204 in a
"scalping" operation where the adviser trades against the recommendations he gives205 or use by access persons of "inside information."206 The use of such an approach in these cases, moreover, can
be justified on conventional fiduciary or "trust and confidence"
grounds.207
Perhaps jurisdictional considerations have played a role in the
decision not to emphasize the fiduciary notion in the development of
general standards of investment advice. At common law, the fiduciary's violation of his duty of care and skill ordinarily does not constitute "fraud," 208 while, of course, "disloyalty" does. As a consequence, if the SEC's jurisdiction is limited by notions of "fraud," 200
however watered-down, then the fiduciary approach leaves vitally
important aspects of the fiduciary's activities beyond its reachunless by some bootstrap magic the duty of loyalty drags both care
and skill with it.
Two recent comments from high places add to the piquancy of
this line of cases. The United States Supreme Court seems to have
gone out of its way, in the recent Capital Gains Research decision, to
note that fiduciary obligations have implications outside the concept of loyalty. 210 And the present chairman of the SEC has stated211
rities Exchange Act Release No. 6209 (March 17, 1960); Looper &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5676 (April 15, 1959).
201. 27 S.E.C. 629, 638 (1948).
202. Paul K. Peers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 187, at 3 (March 22,
1965). See also Spear &: Staff, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 188, at 5 (March
25, 1965) (where, in the discussion of the duties of "fiduciaries" who advertise their
services, the SEC cites opinions not involving registered investment advisers); notes 152
&: 170 supra.
203. See generally BAKER &, CARY, CORPORATIONS 416-91 (3d ed. 1959).
204. Looper &: Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 300-01 (1958); R. H. Johnson &: Co., 36 S.E.C. 467
(1955), afj'd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); Norris &: Hirschberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946), petition for rehearing denied, 22 S.E.C. 558 (1946), remanded, 163 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867 (1948), afj'd, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
205. SEC v. Capital Gains Research :Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
206. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cady, Roberts
&: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
207. See note 255 infra.
208. See note 199 supra.
209. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
210. SEC v. Capital Gains Research :Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
211. Cohen &: Rabin 703-04.
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that this fiduciary approach and the fraud theories discussed earlier
are, after all, pretty much the same thing and "can be viewed as
different ways of characterizing the obligations imposed . . . by
the statutory provisions in varying contexts." 212 Together, he suggests, they afford a desirable basis for developing needed standards
in this area. 213

7. General Conclusions
How does this melange of theories affect investment advice? The
Special Study found no evidence, as the summary given at the outset
suggests, that they have had any appreciable impact upon the general
run of advisory conduct. Several possible explanations for this can
be suggested. The opinions in which the theories are to be found
usually involve the vague application of several theories to the same
conduct, making a concise and meaningful summary difficult. 214 In
fact, such a summary is not to be found. 215 Moreover, these theories,
despite the considerable volume of decisions, have, for the most part,
been brought to bear upon that very limited segment of the advisory
community engaged in what has apparently been considered especially reprehensible conduct. 216 (It is hardly likely, of course, that the
SEC or anyone else would suggest that these standards of advisory
conduct apply only to this group.) Adding to the confusion is the
marked tendency, considered more fully at a later point, to fragmentize the advisory process for purposes of imposing controls. 217
8. Private Actions
Before leaving this subject of federally-created standards for investment advice, there should be some mention of the cases in which
a private action was based upon the federal statutory provisions. At
the outset, we may put to the side cases in this category involving
"corporate insiders," and related situations,218 where an advantage
is obtained in a purchase or sale by not disclosing relevant "inside
information." Because these cases build upon more conventional
212. Id. at 702-04.
213. Id. at 702-08.
214. See note 82 supra.
215. 3 Loss 1474-93; Fishman, Stock Brokers and the Public Investor, 53 ILL• .B.J.
992 (1965); Ruder, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule JOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 824
(1965); Civil Liability Under Section JOB and Rule JOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing
the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965). See also Levin & Evan, Professionalism
and the Stockbroker, 21 Bus. I.Aw. 337 (1966).
216. See note 72 supra. A recent and significant exception is Shearson, Hammill &
Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965).
217. See text accompanying notes 271 & 296 infra.
218. See .BAKER & CARY, CORPORATIONS 536-52 (3d ed. 1959). See also note 206 supra.

1600

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1569

fraud notions,219 they throw little light on the application of the
"anti-fraud" concepts to typical advisory activity.
Recognition of a private cause of action was not achieved without
birth pangs. The courts first grappled with the problem of the seller
who wanted to bring a private action complaining of fraud, and
sought to base his cause on the federal statutes.220 While sections 11
and 12 of the 1933 act expressly provided-in some situations at
least-for private actions against the seller, there was no comparable
express provision in either of the acts for one by him. 221 A way
around this was found, but over some rocky ground. A cause was
created by implication from the fact that other sections (particularly
I0(b)(5)) 222 made fraudulent conduct unlawful. Moreover, having
recognized a right by implication in favor of the seller, the buyer,
also, was found to have a cause of action on the same theory, despite
his express rights under sections 11 and 12. To reach this conclusion,
however, the courts felt compelled to differentiate between the
express private action and that which was implied, because the
sections expressly creating the right, in addition to imposing other
important limitations upon that right, also created a defense for
the seller: in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant could not
have discovered the truth. 223 This language is not to be found in the
sections on which the implied cause is based. "Scienter" was the
equalizer-it was held not necessary to the expressly created action
because the "reasonable care" defense provided a substitute; however,
a finding of its presence was held obligatory in actions which arose
by implication. The leading case is an opinion in the Second Circuit,
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,224 in which Judge Jerome Frank
wrote for the court.
That there is much about this which is puzzling has been commented upon by scholars.225 However this may be, the position taken
in Fischman that the private cause of action on the implied theory
requires an allegation of "scienter," albeit a ·watered-down version, 226
219. See note 255 infra.
220. See generally 3 Loss 1778-92.
221. Securities Act §§ 11 &: 12(2).
222. Securities Act § 17a; Exchange Act § 10b. Both sections are referred to in
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co. (discussed at note 224 infra), but principal reliance is
rested upon IOb. See also Ruder supra note 215; Civil Liability Under Section JOB and
Rule lOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
223. See note 164 supra.
224. 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); 3 Loss 1778-92.
225. See ibid; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication Through Rule JOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REY. 185 (1964). See also Shulman,
Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
226. See text accompanying note 174 supra and authorities cited in note 214 supra.
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while the expressly created cause does not, seems to have taken hold
in a substantial number of courts, 227 even though some disagree. 228
When Judge Frank's conclusions, and the SEC's approach are
compared,229 it is obvious that we are faced with differing notions of
"fraud." According to the former, a private action under sections
IO(b) and 17(a) requires proof of scienter. On the other hand, the
SEC's anti-fraud theories, discussed at length above, are based upon
the same sections, 230 and the SEC does not treat scienter as necessary.
While it seems clear that an action brought by the SEC complaining
of fraudulent conduct need not allege all the elements necessary to
make out a private cause based upon the same facts, particularly
with respect to reliance and proof of loss, 231 surely the basic characteristics of the outlawed conduct should be the same.
Perhaps in part because of the uncertainty which these cases reflect as to what will support a cause of action for improper advisory
conduct, the private suit has not played an important role in controlling such conduct. The reported decisions have not complained of
the care and skill aspects of advisory conduct by professionals.232
C. Controls at the State Level
If blue sky laws, the repository of state statutory controls in this
area, are effective in policing advisory conduct, there is little sign of
it in the reported decisions and administrative orders or in the conduct of those in the business.233 All states but one have blue sky
laws, 284 and over half the states require securities salesmen to pass an
examination of some sort. 235 While some unqualified people have
undoubtedly thereby been excluded from the business, these examinations, like those required by the self-regulatory organizations,
227. Glickman v. Schweickart, 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Weber v. C.M.P.
Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., 229 F: Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Trussel v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
228. Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Dack
v. Sharman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v . .Bankers
13ond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
229. Compare text accompanying notes 153 &: 170 supra.
230. See ~ext accompanying note 76 supra.
231. See 3 Loss 1757-92.
232. See cases cited in notes 227 &: 228 supra. But see 13ercow v. Kidder, Peabody &:
Co., 1964-66 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 91,452 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
233. See Loss &: CowETr, 13LUE SKY I.Aw 86 (1958); Special Study 148-49, 322-23, 374.
234. Loss &: CoWETr, supra note 233, at 17; I 1967 13LUE SKY L. REP. 11 503. The
exception is Nevada.
235. special Study 133.
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make no real effort to test competence in securities research and
analysis. 236
Most of the state statutes proscribe "fraud,"237 but there is considerable variety of approach in defining it: several clearly cover
at least some forms of negligent conduct,238 while others. patterned
on the federal statute, possibly encompass such conduct.239 Some
contain stringent scienter requirements. 240 A number expressly provide the investor with a private remedy having varying limitations.241
Although these statutes have not given rise to administrative rules
comparable in extent to those created at the federal level, regulations of some interest are to be found in several states. In some,
specific investment advice practices are prohibited, such as use of
"comparisons"242 and assurances that an investment is "safe."243 In
others, there are echoes of the "shingle" theory in prohibitions
against both "excessive mark-ups" 244 and violations of the "suitability" principle.245 Concern for "loyalty" is also apparent in the
prohibition of such specific conduct as failure to reveal an interest
in a recommended security,246 trading "against orders,'' 247 and
"churning." 248 One state, Alabama, specifically provides that a
236. See Special Study 125, 129, 131-33, 145-46, !174: Loss&: CmVEIT, supra note 2!1!1,
at 252-56. See also Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pts. I &: 2, at 14!1, 144, 147 (1964).
237. I 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 503; Loss &: COWE'lT, supra note 233, at 21. A number, of course, carry criminal sanctions. Id. at 21-25, 387-89.
238. ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(a)(2) (1958); Ala, Rule 7B, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1l
5617; IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854 (rep!. vol. 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.260 (1966).
239. See Loss &: COWETI', supra note 233, at 147-60. See also Special Study 374 n,277,
322-23.
240. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 32(i), 45 (1965).
241. Loss&: CoWETI', supra note 233, at 147.
242. Ala. Rule 19 § 9, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 5629; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit, 10,
§ 649 (1945); Ariz. Order S-2, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L REP. 11 6652.
243. Ala. Rule 19 § 13, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 5629; Ariz. Order S-2, 1 1967
BLUE SKY L. REP. 1[ 6652.
244. 2 1967 .BLUE SKY L REP. (Mich.) 1125,672; N.D. CE11.-r. CODE§ 10-04-11(4) (1960);
Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 1707.19 (Page 1964}; Ohio Ruling 28, 2 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP.
,r 38,728; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1629 (rep!. vol. 1964): see text accompanying note 87

supra.
245. Ala. Rule 26 § 13, I 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. ,J 5636; Mich. Rule 110, 2 1967
BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 25,660.
246. Ala. Rule 19 § 110, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 5629; CAL. ADl\nN. CODE § 651
(1963); Ohio D.S.-8, 2 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 38,668.
247. Ala. Rule 26 § 7, l 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. ,r 5636; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 952 (Mc•
Kinney 1944).
248. Ill. Rule 190, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1[ 16,6!15; Mich. Rule 110, 2 1967 BLUE
SKY L. REP. 1[ 25,660; Wis. § 1.05, 3 1967 BLUE SK.Y L. REP. 1[ 52,605; Wis. § 1.15, !I
1967 .BLUE SKY L. REP. 1[ 52,615.
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broker-dealer shall be subject to "fiduciary obligations" in dealing
with his clients. 249
Despite what appears to be a pattern of expanding state regulation, there is, under these statutes, a dearth of case law development
involving care and skill in advisory conduct.250 There are, however,
recent indications of greater judicial activity in this area. 251 Much
the same picture appears when the cases relying upon common-law
principles are examined. The successful use of "fraud" as including
lack of care and skill in the advisory process has not been extensive, 252 despite the willingness of some state courts to absorb the
law of negligence into the law of fraud. 253 On the other hand, there
are several actions based upon conventional negligence in which both
the diligence and skill of the investment advisor are given consideration. 204 More frequent are cases in which equitable relief is awarded
upon proof of a conventional fiduciary or "trust and confidence"
relationship and a violation of the duty of loyalty inherent in it. 255
In all, there seems to be little reason to question the conclusion
of those who assert that state controls and sanctions are of little consequence in policing advisory conduct.256
V.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE SPECIAL STUDY

Although the Special Study does not contain a critical examination of the fraud theories, 257 it does, if nothing else, raise serious
questions as to the adequacy of the SEC's fraud approach, and thus
casts doubt on the only viable means presently available to encourage
care and skill in the more important aspects of advisory conduct.258
249. Ala. Rule 26 § 10, 1 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 5636.
250. I 1967 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1111 3955, 3571. See also authorities cited in note 215
supra.
251. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Colo. 1964). The
Special Study found an increasing interest on the part of the states in competency standards in this area. Special Study 133.
252. An extensive search reveals several cases where this was attempted, e.g., '\Veber
v. C.M.P. Corp., (1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 91,539 S.D.N.Y.
1965); Bcrcow v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., (1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 11 91,452 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Otis & Co. v. Grimes, 97 Colo. 219, 48 P.2d 788 (1935);
S. Curtiss 8: Co. v. White, 90 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. 1935).
253. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
254 E.g., Twachtman v. Connelly, 106 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1939); Warwick v. Addicks,
35 Del. 43, 157 Atl. 205 (Del. 1931); Liberman v. McDonnell, 97 Cal. App. 171, 275
Pac. 486 (1929).
255. Compare Fischer v. Slayton Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 167, 134 N.E.2d 673 (1956)
with O'Connor v. Burns, Potter & Co., 151 Neb. 9, 36 N.W.2d 507 (1949).
256. Sec note 233 supra.
257. They are given brief mention in Special Study 139, 145-48, 302, 375.
258. See text accompanying notes 53 & 233 supra.
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These doubts are raised only by implication, however, for rather than
examining the fundamental soundness of the fraud appro_ach, the
Special Study seems to have assumed that this way of dealing with
problems of investment advice is basically sound, and only in need
of being strengthened and supplemented.259 Proposals to this end,
following three general lines, can be found among the Study recommendations. 260
The first approach includes proposals that the self-regulatory
organizations adopt rules or policy statements which would deter
firms from representing in advertising materials, as they habitually
have done,261 that they offer research and advisory services when
they are not reasonably equipped to do so,262 and that firms be required to disclose, in printed advisory materials, the sources of information relied on and the research techniques used. 203 Less was
to be required in the case of oral advice, since it was apparently
considered to be fundamentally different: there should be "disclaimers" when advice does not emanate from the firm's own research
department, and the prediction of future specific price levels of
individual stocks is to be condemned. 264 These are, in the main,
disclosure proposals, designed to give the investor some warning
as to what he is getting rather than attempting to establish standards
of skill and care for advisory conduct generally.265
In discussions before congressional committees considering the
Special Study recommendations, the SEC took the position that
these proposals could be implemented under its existing authority
to control "fraud."266 The proposals have not, however, brought
about any change in the SEC's rules. 267 The response has been more
positive elsewhere, for the recommendations seem to have prompted
Special Study 237-42, 302-04, 328-30, 375-76, 383-87. See also id. at 5-6.
These are to be found in Special Study 386-87. See also id. at 158-60.
See note 38 supra.
Special Study 386, para. "I." See also note 23 supra.
Special Study 386-87, para. "2." These include disclosure of sources of information, research techniques used or other bases of information; name of person re5ponsible for preparation of the material, and dating of the material; most recently filed
disclosures of issuers and representation that such data has been examined (or identification of issuers for which no data is available). Predicting future specific price
levels should also be prohibited.
Other practices, such as trading against advice and claiming to have "inside information," which are less closely related to formulation of recommendations, are also
criticized. Id. at 386-87.
264. Id. at 386, para. "2."
265. See text accompanying notes 69 & 105 supra.
266. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642, supra note 236, at 29.
267. See 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 4800; 2 id. at 11 22,725 &: 25,065. See also 2 id.
at 11 25,059-25,060 A-D (regulation of broker-dealers not members of a registered
national security association: proposed regulation).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

June 1967]

Investment Advice

1605

changes in the regulations of the New York and American Stock
Exchanges and the NASD. 268 The most important, and interesting,
of these is a change in their respective "standards for advertising,
market letters, sales literature, research reports, radio, television and
writing activities," to the effect that printed advisory recommendations "must have a basis which can be substantiated as reasonable,"289
and the addition of a provision that where a member organization
"advertises or promotes its research services or capabilities [it] must
have a reasonable basis for any claims it makes." 270
These rules are disappointing in several respects. They are principally aimed at printed advisory materials, and thus perpetuate the
artificial and undesirable distinction between oral and written
advice.271 Furthermore, no "guidelines" are suggested for determining what constitutes a "reasonable basis" in this situation. Without
some elaboration, it may be doubted whether this "reasonable basis"
rule will have any greater impact upon the bulk of advisory conduct
than did the SEC's own "reasonable basis" (Shingle Theory No. 3)
rule which was in effect at the time of the Special Study investigation.272 The manner in which these recommendations were commented upon by the self-regulatory organizations when the recommendations were receiving congressional attention, suggests that they
were thought to involve little in the 1,vay of change.273 These developments do, of course, serve to arm the SEC with honest-to-goodness
standards of the profession for purposes of Shingle Theory No. 1.274
Since the Special Study recommended that comparable substantive rules be adopted with respect to that segment of the investment
268. See Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 679J and S. 1642, supra note 236, at 145, 240,
1256.
269. CCH AM. STOCK ExCH. GUIDE 11 9495 (1964); 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExCH. GUIDE
11 2474 A,10(1); NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF SECURrl'IES DEALERS, NATIONAL .As.,OCIATION OF
SECURlTIES DEALERS l\L\NUAL G-21 (1965).
270. CCH Ax. STOCK ExCH. GumE 11 9495.10(9) (1964); 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH.
GUIDE 1[ 2474 A.10(9) (1964). See also NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
op. cit. supra note 269, at G-22.
271. From the investors' point of view, it is difficult to appreciate a system of regulation concerned principally with controls for impersonal printed advice rather than
for personal oral advice. This, however, appears to be the case. See also Special Study at
386-87 (especially paras. "I"&: "2"), with which compare 328-30 (especially paras. "4" &:
"5"): Rule 483, CCH Ax. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 11 9493 (1964); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, op. cit. supra note 269, at G-19 to 22. But see AssocIATION OF STOCK
EXCHANGE FIRMS, MANUAL FOR REGISTERED REl'RESENTAnvE 11 (1963) ("the advice given
must be based on good faith and upon informed judgment of investment facts, not
on rumor'1, See text accompanying note 296 infra,
272. See text accompanying note US supra.
273. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 679:J and S, 1612, supra note 236, at 860-61, 894,
410-11, 475-76, 690, 705-07.
274. See text accompanying note 99 supra,
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advice community which charges for its advice, 275 such rules are
presumably being considered by the SEC, along with other questions
relating to that group, such as whether it should be organized into
an official "self-regulatory organization." 276 It is possible, however,
that the SEC may feel that the "anti-fraud rules" are adequate to deal
with this segment of the advisory community as well as others not
affiliated with a self-regulatory group. 277 This would seem to be indicated by its recently released "proposed rules" for broker-dealers
who are not members of a registered self-regulatory organization,
which do not include a "reasonable basis" standard.278
The second major recommendation appeared in that part of the
report concerned with "qualification for entry into the securities
business," 279 a matter given considerable emphasis in the report. 280
The Special Study findings showed that practically anyone could
enter and had entered the business of giving securities advice. 281 To
remedy this, the report stated that standards for entry should generally encompass "(a) competence, in the sense of knowledge and
experience, (b) character and integrity, and (c) financial capacity
and responsibility." 282 With particular reference to advisory activities, the Special Study recommended that experience qualifications
should in all cases be required "for the supervisor of research activities. " 283
In its legislative proposals to implement the report recommendations, the SEC successfully sought authority to put entry standards
into effect. 284 The 1964 amendments granted the SEC the power to
require self-regulatory agencies to adopt standards which are necessary or desirable with respect to "training, experience, and . . .
other qualifications"; 285 where there is no appropriate self-regulatory
organization to impose such standards, the SEC may do so. 286 This
legislation, which applies only to broker-dealers and their em275. Special Study 386, para. "5."
276. Ibid. See also id. at 148.
277. See in this connection, Special Study 382-83. Compare id. at 375-76. The special
Study report shows ample reason for concern for advisory conduct by this group.
Special Study 334-44, 363-69; Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642, supra
note 236, at 5, 155.
278. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 77,412 (1966).
279. Special Study 47-162.
280. Ibid. See also Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1612, supra note 236,
at 71, 103-05, 111, 125-26.
281. See note 65 supra.
282. Special Study 160, para. "6."
283. Id. at 161, para. "8."
284. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642, supra note 236, at 50, 103-05;
see note 280 supra.
285. Exchange Act § 15(A)(b)(5), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 20,380 (1964).
286. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 20,360 (1964).
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ployees,287 has brought about two developments. First, the SEC has
adopted a rule to cover broker-dealers who are not members of a
self-regulatory organization which requires an examination, "if
any part of their securities activities is in ... research or investment
advice." 288 Successful completion of several examinations currently
required of salesmen, including those required by twenty-one states,
will fulfill the SEC requirement. 289 Second, the New York and American Stock Exchanges have amended their rules to require that
printed advisory material reaching the public must be approved by
a "supervisory analyst acceptable to the Exchange."290
When examined in light of the emphasis given this matter by the
Special Study recommendations, these steps appear quite modest. 291
Here, too, an investor may be puzzled by the preoccupation of the
exchange with standards for written advice, 292 particularly in view of
the Study's conclusion that "minimal standards of competence or
experience should be applied to each person who is responsible for
actually transmitting unsupervised investment recommendations to
the public."293 0£ course, entry standards related to competence in
both formulating and communicating investment advice, such as
those suggested for the "supervisory analyst," will undoubtedly contribute to an aura of "professionalism"294 in this area of business
activity. Yet it should be emphasized that such entry standards do
not remedy the weaknesses which have been explored in the cases
resting on the fraud approach: once entry standards are met, the
SEC must still fall back on those fraud theories to police advisory
287. Ibid. The recommendations clearly indicate that comparable developments are
necessary in the case of registered investment advisers. See notes 13 8: 276 supra.
288. Exchange Act Reg. 240.15b8-l, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 26,904 (1967).
289. Securities E.xchangc Act Release No. 7697, Sept. 7, 1965. See also Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7603, May 18, 1965.
290. Rule 483, supra note 271; Rule 472, 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 11 2472
(1964); Rule 344, 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExCH. GUIDE 11 2344 (1964); Rule 343, CCH AM.
STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 1J 9343 (1964). See also NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, op. cit. supra note 269, at G-22. There are, of course, private organizations
with impressive standards in the advice area, such as the "Financial Analysts Federa•
tion." Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642, Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I 8: 2,
at 150. See also id. at 361.
291. Although great emphasis is placed upon the individual (see Special Study 160
para. "4') as the proper "unit" for regulation purposes (see also id. at 250, 323-24), the
principal concern here seems to be the qualification of supervisory personnel in
distributing printed advisory material. This leaves to some other, not so obvious,
control approach the oral investment advice originating with the salesman, as well
as that coming over the firm's wire service. See special Study 358; text accompanying
note 4 supra.
292. See notes 271 supra and 296 infra.
293. Special Study 158.
294. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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conduct. 295 Little help can be expected from the self-regulatory
agencies in this regard, since little has been done to put teeth into
their policing of standards of care and skill.
Finally, a third general recommendation of the Study report
urged the adoption of legislation or rules which would both expressly prohibit "reckless dissemination of written investment advice"
and, where it occurs, subject those responsible "to civil liability in
favor of customers reasonably relying thereon to their detriment." 296
Once again the emphasis is upon written advice. Implementing
legislation was not sought by the SEC,297 and the House subcommittee during its hearings asked for an explanation.298 Acknowledging that the proposals "would prohibit reckless dissemination of
written investment advice,'' 299 Chairman Cary admitted that the
SEC was "in agreement with" the recommendations,300 but gave no
indication as to how they might be put into effect.301 This indication
of agreement is incomprehensible unless the SEC is thinking of
retreating from the position taken under the several anti-fraud
theories, where the SEC has not insisted upon a finding of "recklessness," and where coverage has not been limited to written advice. 302
There would, of course, be some merit in putting the private right
on a less attenuated basis.303
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Special Study findings show a pressing need for a re-examination of the controls over investment advice. First, most of those giving
advice have acted as if there were no controls, and have professed
to know of no minimum required standard of skill in the task of
formulating investment recommendations. This is, perhaps, understandable in view of the subtleties of the fraud approach and the
vagueness of its impact on investment advice. Second, while the
historian might be able to explain the differing treatment of written
295. PROSSER, TORTS 167-68 (3d ed. 1964).
296. Special Study 387, para. "4.''
297. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S.1612, supra note 290, at 29.
298. Id. at 28.
299. Ibid.
300. Ibid.
301. Ibid.
302. See text accompanying notes 152, 170 &: 172 supra. It bas indicated elsewhere
that it thinks this might be handled by a rule. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and
S. 1612, supra note 290, at 483; SEC Special Market Study Release No. 25, at 5,
April 30, 1963.
303. See text accompanying note 229 supra. Here, too, there is a serious definitional
problem. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1612, supra note 290, at 708, 821.
See also note 181 supra.
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and oral advice, no one could convince an investor that this should
be so.
Clearly some valuable additions to advisory conduct controls are
traceable to the Special Study. Where there had been few entry
standards, now there are more, albeit modest and applicable only to
broker-dealers. Also, as regards broker-dealers, there is now a requirement that printed materials be approved by a "supervisory
analyst." But in the all-important area of general standards little has
changed. The SEC seems satisfied with the complicated line of argument it has successfully used, presumably because this line has been
good enough to win. Yet, these fine-spun fraud theories obviously
are unintelligible as behavior standards. As a result, most firms have
conceived of their advisory task as involving merely the duty to
give an honest opinion about a stock, based upon a rapid check of
readily available material. It would be surprising if they view their
duty any differently since the Special Study, although some firms
may feel greater restraint in using their "research" label. Moreover,
it might be argued that the anti-fraud rules, despite the extension of
their tentacles, have application only to extremely reprehensible
advisory conduct, and really do not reach the run-of-the-mill
variety. 304 Assuming this to be so, and assuming also that there are
some unexpressed, self-imposed limitations upon the SEC in its application of these rules, the need for standards becomes all the more
imperative and the confusion over the "fraud rules" even greater.
Before the factual findings of the Special Study grow useless with
age, there should be a clearer delineation of standards by both the'
SEC and the self-regulatory organizations. The standards adopted
should not treat oral and printed advice as if they were functionally
different, one from the other; rather, identical, clearly defined standards of care and skill should be applied to all advisory activity
which must have a sound, professional research base if it is responsibly prepared.305 Such an approach need not rule out recognition
of a category of "merchandising" firms, rather than "advisory" firms,
which, perhaps, could be permitted to disseminate purely "factual
information," clearly identified as such. With a clearer delineatiOJ:?of standards, the SEC and the self-regulatory agencies could concentrate their enforcement efforts upon broader problems, such as the
304. Levin and Evan, Professionalism and the Stock Broker, 21 Bus. LAw. 337
(1966). See also Special Study 326-27.
305. See, with respect to general standards, the testimony of Amyas Ames, President,
American Bankers Association of America, Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and
S. 1612, supra note 290, at 686, 707, &: 731. See also note 306 infra.
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conspicuous absence of both adequate numbers of personnel qualified
to carry on "advisory activities," and procedures to assure the utilization of their services. Also, with a clarification of responsibilities, the
private action could be expected to play a more important enforcement role.
As was truly stated by Mr. Amyas Ames, President of the Investment Bankers Association of America, in his testimony before the
House subcommittee during hearings on the Special Study recommendations:
Many, if not most, of the abuses and undesirable practices described
in the [Special Study] report could be eliminated to a very great
extent by the imposition and enforcement of higher standards of
conduct, experience, competency, integrity, and financial responsibility which must be met by persons engaged in the securities
business.306
306. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642, supra note 290, at 676. It is
apparent that Mr. Ames favored general standards, rather than an elaborate web of
controls, for those in different segments of the industry doing essentially the same
task. See note 305 supra.

